DEPLETED URANIUM

"Unborn children of the region [are] being asked to pay the highest price, the integrity of their DNA."

- Ross B. Mirkarimi, The Arms Control Research Centre, from his report:
‘The Environmental and Human Health Impacts of the Gulf Region with Special Reference to Iraq.’ May 1992

US air crew in Saudi Arabia loading Depleted Uranium ammunition into an A-10 'Warthog'
Photo courtesy of Chris Kornkven, 1991

This page, and links, presents a large amount of articles and information relating to the Depleted Uranium controversy. The subject finally reached the mainstream press and television after the NATO led bombing of Kosovo, and after years of campaigning by grassroots organisations.

In 1996, the UN Subcommission on Human Rights classified Depleted Uranium ammunition as an indiscriminate 'Weapon of Mass Destruction', and a 'Crime Against Humanity'. In my own opinion, the use of DU, and the subsequent massive efforts to downplay its' after-effects represents one of the most stupendous and outrageous lies ever told by Western governments.

A minimum of 940,000 rounds of DU were fired by US forces during the Gulf 'war'. An estimated 300 metric tonnes of DU material was deposited over vast tracts of land, primarily in Southern Iraq. A letter was sent to the Royal UK Ordnance on April 21st 1991, by Paddy Bartholomew, Business Development Manager of AEA Technology, the trading name for the UK Atomic Energy Authority. Enclosed was a 'threat paper', marked 'UK restricted' which set out the true nature of the contamination:

"US tanks fired 5000 rounds, US aircraft many tens of thousands of rounds, and UK tanks a small number of DU rounds. The tank ammunition alone will amount to greater then 50,000 lbs. of DU. [...] If the tank inventory of the DU was inhaled, the latest International Committee of Radiological Protection risk factor calculates 500,000 potential deaths. The DU will spread around the battlefield and target vehicles in various sizes and quantities. [....] It would be unwise for people to stay close to large quantities of DU for long periods and this would obviously be of concern to the local population if they collect this heavy metal and keep it."

Bartholomew's covering letter said that the contamination of Kuwait was "....emotive and thus must be dealt with in a sensitive manner."

The US military were well aware of the health risks of DU, long before the Gulf war, as the following document excerpts make clear:

"[...] Personnel in or near (less than approximately 50 metres) an armoured vehicle at the time these vehicles were struck by Depleted Uranium munitions could receive significant internal DU exposures (i.e. those in excess of allowable standards)."

- Excerpt from a US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) report 1989. The BRL study determined that an average of 79% of airborne DU particles measured downwind of an impacted vehicle were of respirable size (less then 10 microns in diameter), meaning that if inhaled they could become permanently trapped in the lungs. (Information provided by Colonel Eric Daxon, Radiation Protection Staff Officer of the US Army Medical Command, in a 1996 letter to researcher Dan Fahey).

"Aerosol DU (Depleted Uranium) exposures to soldiers on the battlefield could be significant with potential radiological and toxicological effects. [...] Under combat conditions, the most exposed individuals are probably ground troops that re-enter a battlefield following the exchange of armour-piercing munitions. [...] We are simply highlighting the potential for levels of DU exposure to military personnel during combat that would be unacceptable during peacetime operations. [...DU is..]... a low level alpha radiation emitter which is linked to cancer when exposures are internal, [and] chemical toxicity causing kidney damage. [...] Short term effects of high doses can result in death, while long term effects of low doses have been linked to cancer. [...] Our conclusion regarding the health and environmental acceptability of DU penetrators assume both controlled use and the presence of excellent health physics management practices. Combat conditions will lead to the uncontrolled release of DU. [...] The conditions of the battlefield, and the long term health risks to natives and combat veterans may become issues in the acceptability of the continued use of DU kinetic penetrators for military applications.

This report (Volume 2) summarises data [...] in a way that allows a contrasting of the differences in health risk between Depleted Uranium (DU) and Tungsten (W) as kinetic energy penetrators. [...] Whilst much more is known about the health effects of uranium than of tungsten alloys, the comparable information on chemical toxicity indicates that insoluable DU is approximately 25 times more toxic than insoluable tungsten, and soluable DU is 20 times more toxic than soluable tungsten when exposure is at the limits allowed by the regulations. [...] Radiation effects are unique to DU. Therefore, this represents a risk which does not apply to tungsten."

- Excerpt from the July 1990 Science and Applications International Corporation report: ' Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environment and Health Considerations', as included in Appenix D - US Army Armaments, Munitions and Chemical Command report: 'Kinetic Energy Penetrator Long Term Strategy Study, July 1990'

It was only after the war had ended that the following warning was issued to US troops:

"Any system struck by a DU penetrator can be assumed to be contaminated with DU. [...] Personnel should avoid entering contaminated systems [and] personnel exposed to DU contamination should wash exposed areas and discard clothings."

- US Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command message, March 7th 1991, as cited by Dan Fahey in 'Depleted Uranium - The Stone Unturned' March 28th 1997

On July 12th 1991, a fire broke out at the US Army base at Doha in Kuwait. During six hours of explosions and eighteen hours of residual fires, a large amount of equipment and munitions were burnt, including 9720 small caliber DU rounds, 660 large caliber DU rounds, and four tanks with DU armour. In such severe fire conditions the DU rounds will have burned and completely oxidised into powder. Of the 9006 pounds of DU penetrators lost in the fire, several thousand pounds were oxidised, scattered around the compound by violent explosions, and carried to the Southeast by a steady 8 knot wind. Whilst the fire was raging, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal team en route to Doha explicity warned commanders to move their soldiers out of the downwind smoke plume and to wear protective masks. (US Central Command log: "11 ACR Fire in Doha: Updates from Centcom Forward" July 12th 1991: Entry 10) But this warning was never passed on; indeed soldiers involved in the clean up operation wore no respirators or protective clothing whilst using shovels and brooms to clean the contaminated compound. The US army still does not know, or will not admit, what dangers are posed by residual DU contamination to soldiers who deploy to Doha base today.

By 1995, the official line had begun to downplay the risks, but  still recognised that DU was radioactive waste and should be treated as such, as well as making clear that the use of DU weapons presented a health risk of indeterminate nature:

- Report by the US Army Environmental Policy Institute: 'Health and Consequences of Depleted Uranium use in the US army', June 1995

In January 1996, Brent Scowcroft, the former US National Security Advisor, was interviewed by Channel 4 UK Television for their documentary 'The Magic Bullet.' During his interview he stated:

"Depleted Uranium is more of a problem than we thought when it was developed. But it was developed according to standards, and was thought through very carefully. It turned out, perhaps, to be wrong."

On learning of the potential health risks, the Saudi Arabian government requested that US forces dig back up and remove all DU struck vehicles which they had buried in the sands of that country. Other US vehicles involved in DU 'friendly-fire' incidents were sealed and shipped back to North Carolina where they spent THREE YEARS in decontamination at a vacuum sealed facility.

Levels of cancer, particularly in Southern Iraq where the majority of the DU was fired, have skyrocketed. In some areas the increase is as much as ten fold, whilst cancer rates across the country have risen by a minimum of 100%, with children experiencing a 250% increase. The Iraqi Atomic Agency estimated in 1999 that 48% of the population had been exposed to varying degrees of carcinogenic material. Extreme birth deformities have risen as much as four fold. The true legacy of DU is yet to be seen, yet the US and UK continue to deny there is any link between this cancer epidemic and DU ammunition. The UK has no plans to discontinue its' use. DU is now possessed in the military arsenals of at least fifteen countries.

540,000 US troops served in the 'war'. 138 lost their lives in combat, friendly fire incidents and general accidents. Over 9,600 veterans have died since. Over 120,000 have filed reports of unusual, often completely debilitating, illnesses. A sigificant percentage have fathered children with extreme birth deformities.

Despite all the internal US and UK army documentation, and all external civilian scientific investigation, great controversy still rages in the mainstream about the real or perceived dangers of DU. It is a measure of the in-built bias of mainstream reporting that the bulk of the argument revolves around whether 'our' troops have been adversely affected or not. Very little is reported of the civilians in target countries who have to live with the shadow of DU. And to date, to my knowledge, not a single spokesperson who advocates its' safety has ever volunteered to breath in or handle DU dust from strike sites.

Why not_

For ease of reference I have broken this page down into sections.

WHAT IS DEPLETED URANIUM_

In the nuclear industry naturally occurring Uranium is utilised for both power generation and weapons manufacture. The metal is radioactive and chemically reactive, forming a range of soluble and insoluble compounds. Like other heavy metals it is chemically poisonous, and in particular damages the kidneys which then may retard the removal of the metal from the body.

It consists of three isotopes (i.e three types of atoms) which share the same chemical properties but differ in nuclear structure. Isotope U-234 is the least abundant in the metal, but the most radioactive. U-235 is utilised by the nuclear industry. U-238 is the most abundant and the least radioactive.

For nuclear industry use U-235 is 'enriched' by the removal of U-238. The by-product U-238 is called 'Depleted Uranium'. Due to the stability of its' atoms DU has a low radioactivity, but a half-life of 4,500 million years. However, it is not possible to completely separate the isotopes, and DU contains traces of the more radioactive U-234 and U-235.

WHAT IS DU USED FOR_

Until its' inclusion in ammunition manufacture, DU was a waste product. Due to its' high density, it is in use as weights and ballast in many military and civilian applications, particularly aerospace. So long as DU does not catch fire, the dangers from it are slight.

Storage of waste DU is very expensive, as it requires licensed repositories. Its' abundance has proved very attractive to combat applications as it is cheap and easily available. As a result of its' high density and the extreme temperatures generated by its' combustion, DU 'penetrators' can slice through all currently known types of armour plating.

IS DU SAFE_

There is NO SAFE DOSE OF ANY RADIATION.

In the case of DU, once a shell has struck its' target, it ignites and burns at temperatures of up to 10,000 degrees Centigrade. As it does so, it releases a plume of fine particles of U-238 oxides, some of which can be breathed in. These particles are very small and largely insoluble, and can be carried long distances by the wind. Soluble particles can also enter the food chain and water supply. Once present in these cycles, it is virtually impossible to remove them. With a half-life of 4,500 million years, these particles will still be present at the time of the death of the solar system.

Western governments have gone to enormous trouble to prevent the investigation of DU ammunition effects, and to lie, deceive, repress and downplay the risks. The articles reached by the link below outline the known and confirmed dangers.

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DID WESTERN GOVERNMENTS KNOW OF THE DANGERS OF DU_

The answer is categorically YES.

Indeed, the British government has entered into a Kafka-esque position, stating, often in the same interview or article, that DU is perfectly safe, whilst stressing that their own troops are required to wear full radiological protective clothing whilst in proximity to, or handling material from, DU strikes.

The articles reached by the link below show exactly what the governments knew, how their position was challenged, and what their responses were. They would be almost funny if the subject was not so serious.

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PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION IN DU SHELLS

Early in 2001, during the uproar in Europe about DU use in Kosovo, it came to light that not only is DU contaminated by the more radioactive isotopes U-234 and U-235, but also with Plutonium. Plutonium contamination represents a threat of immense proportions. The people of Iraq and the Balkans can only wait and hope that the situation does not become even more nightmarish than it currently is.

The articles reached by the link below expose another terrible htmlect of radioactive weapons.

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THE SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT AGAINST DU

Whilst suited spokesmen are wheeled out on demand to defend the official line of the government, real scientific data gathering paints a very different picture of DU, not only of its' radioactivity, but of its' equally lethal chemical toxicity.

The articles reached by the link below demonstrate the current level of knowledge about the true nature of DU.

READ ARTICLES

> see also EXTREME DEFORMITIES

A Depleted Uranium shell - Photo courtesy of Professor Siegwart-Horst Gunther

Professor Gunther collected DU samples from Iraq in 1993, and took them back to Germany for analysis. He was arrested by customs agents and jailed for two weeks. He states that he was charged with the offence of 'transporting nuclear materials across international borders' and claims to have had no lawyer or any form of representation, and to have been severely beaten by his captors.

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